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Abstract
A gerrymandered political districting plan is used to benefit a group seeking
to elect more of their own officials into office. This practice happens at
the city, county and state level. A gerrymandered plan can be strategically
designed based on partisanship, race, and other factors. Gerrymandering
poses a contradiction to the idea of “one person, one vote” ruled by the
United States Supreme Court case Reynolds v. Sims (1964) because it values
one demographic’s votes more than another’s, thus creating an unfair
advantage and compromising American democracy. To prevent the practice
of gerrymandering, we must know how to detect a gerrymandered plan. We
can use math to quantify districting plans to test if they were gerrymandered.
To do this, awidely usedmethod is randomly sampling plans to get a baseline
to test if the current or proposed plan is an outlier. If the plan is an outlier,
then it can be argued that the plan was gerrymandered. Recombination is
a Markov Chain and is one method to sample; however, the distribution it
samples from is unknown and therefore presents a problem. In this thesis
I examine the four-by-four grid graph and find the stationary distribution
of Recombination. I analyze the 117 possible districting plans that arise
from a four-by-four grid graph and what each stationary probability means.
This new insight will be added to the collective work at understanding
gerrymandering and how to mathematically detect and prevent it. Such
analysis of Recombination Markov chains has been successfully used in
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Gerrymandering, the process of strategically designing political districts to
win the majority of seats for a party’s candidate, is detrimental to the “one
person, one vote” framework, as ruled in the Supreme Court case Reynolds
v. Sims (1964). The “one person one vote" concept also comes up in the
context of Equal Protection in the United States Constitution under the
14th Amendment (1). Because detecting gerrymandering can be subtle,
there are now substantial efforts to mathematically detect and quantify
gerrymandered plans.
The case of Thomas Hofeller showed how large data can change the pro-
cess of redistricting. After his death, tens of thousands of his files were made
public and exposed the deep connection he had to many gerrymandered
districting plans across the nation (13).
From here we begin to recognize the importance of finding, and sub-
sequently using, data on districting plans to understand whether or not
the plans are gerrymandered. Often when it comes to the discretion of a
judge or panel of judges, the plans can appear reasonable. They can pass
the visual appearance test, the district sizes are relatively even, and there’s a
proportional outcome. Yet even when all this remains true, a plan can still
be gerrymandered.
A research group atDukeUniversity calledQuantifyingGerrymandering
studies potentially gerrymandered districting plans to mathematically find
unbiased evidence for or against gerrymandering. One case the group
assessed was about the North Carolina general assembly districting plan.
Through the use of Markov chains, specifically Flip walks, they concluded
that the plan under-elects Democrats (30). Flip walks offer a mode of
quantifying gerrymandered plans but can be slow and there is no proof of
2 Introduction
whether or not it is mixing fast. The researchers also used Flip walks on
Maryland, a state that Republicans have argued use partisan gerrymandered
plans to benefit Democrats, but their findings were inconclusive (25).
Other methods, such as the efficiency gap and significance without
mixing have been used in states such as Wisconsin (8) and Pennsylvania (20)
to prove gerrymandered districting plans. These methods do not always
work across state lines as we see in Massachusetts (19).
Moon Duchin, an associate professor at Tufts University, was involved
in studying Massachusetts districting plans for whether or not they are
Democrat-favoring partisan gerrymandered plans with the use of Recom-
bination, a Markov chain method (18). She found that the efficiency gap
is not a useful tool in quantifying Massachusetts because the Republican
population is spread evenly across the state and there is no way in which a
districting plan can be drawn to have a Republican majority. She concluded
that each state must be examined individually, there is not one way in which
plans can be determined gerrymandered or not (19).
Recombination is a method of using Markov chains and spanning trees
to establish a baseline for plan comparison. It is an alternative to Flip walks
because it seems faster and involves fewer parameters. This method has
faults: there is a lack of knowledge about howwell it mixes and the stationary
distribution is unknown in most cases. Thus, in this thesis we calculate the
stationary distribution of Recombination for a 4 × 4 grid graph. This can be
found because there are only 117 possible plans.
We find that out of the 117 plans, they can be categorized into 22 distinct
groups based on their symmetry. Many of the plans are rotations and
reflections of each other, therefore they have the same probability as one
another. Out of the 22 groups, there are four probability ranges that the
plans center around. The first is all of the plans with probability around
0.003 that do not have a square district. See Figure 5.1 as an example of
the plan with the smallest probability. The second is all the plans with
probability around 0.009 that have one square district, and the third are the
plans with probability around 0.024 that have two square districts. The final
and fourth group is the singular plan with all four districts as squares with
probability about 0.196, see Figure 5.10. These findings support the idea
that the stationary distribution is related to the number of spanning trees,
and square districts have more spanning trees than the others. This was
surprising to discover, and we hope to eventually extrapolate these methods
to be used in the state level.
Figure 1.1 Smallest probability in all 22 distinct weights, probability =
0.0030503098, 8 rotations/reflections





the Use of Data in Redistricting
in the United States
Arguably gerrymandering has existed since the beginning of the districting
process in the United States. Gerrymandering is the act of politicians altering
districting plans to ensure a majority of that states’ or cities’s seat to benefit
their party. For the purposes of this discussion, we will focus on state-
level gerrymandering, though examples from cities will arise. The phrase
“gerrymander” dates back to 1812 “by those who felt aggrieved by what they
saw as the unfair abuse of the districting process.” (Gerrymandering and
the Construction, 200). The term originated from Governor Elbridge Gerry
who signed a bill that created oddly shaped districts that gave his party an
advantage in the Massachusetts State House election. An artist drew claws,
a head, and wings on Gerry’s home district and declared that it looked
like a salamander. Thus, the name “Gerry-mander"(4) came into popular
vernacular. Arguably the first gerrymander, or “henrymander”(4) as it is
now referred to, occurred in Virginia’s first congressional elections in 1789
when Patrick Henry managed to secure his election over James Madison.
Districting plans can be gerrymandered to “pack” or “crack” a certain
population to limit the power of their votes. Packing a district means that one
population or demographic that votes similarly is put into one district which
diminishes the power of their votes overall. Though that population wins in
one district by a vast majority, their votes lose in the other districts because
there is not a large enough population to get a majority vote. Crackingmeans
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dispersing a population into many districts, making it nearly impossible for
that population to win the majority of votes in any of the districts. Packing
and cracking aim at generating wasted votes for the opponent and thus
reducing opponents’ number of seats. These are two main tactics to create
a gerrymandered plan, but not the only ones. According to Maryland
Governor Larry Hogan, gerrymandering is “one of the biggest problems we
have in America.” (23).
There are now substantial efforts to upend continued gerrymandering
tactics that remain in use today. However, detecting a gerrymandered dis-
tricting plan can be incredibly difficult. Bizarre shapes and disproportional
outcomes are often misleading indicators of a gerrymandered plan. An
example of a bizarre shape is Illinois’s “earmuff” (32) district, or the fourth
Congressional district, that is shaped like an earmuff. Though appearing
gerrymandered because of its odd shape, the district was court mandated
to group the Latino population together. Basically, unusual shapes do not
necessarily constitute gerrymandering. Similarly, through examination of
the Massachusetts case discussed in Chapter 3, Duchin et. al. (19) demon-
strate that the existence of benign and structural obstructions to secure
representation do not solely rely on the vote count but also how the votes
are distributed around the state.
The failure of accountability towards these new districting plans leads
us to this research. This project is a puzzle piece in the larger goal of
being able to mathematically identify gerrymandered plans. Focusing on an
algorithm that is deeply discussed later in this paper, we were able to help
understand a tool that is used to quantify gerrymandering, specifically in a
four-by-four grid graph. Though this example is minute compared to a real
world scenario, understanding the smaller problems must be solved before
we can be sure of the full picture.
2.1 Historical Gerrymandering
The party that holds a Congressional majority usually has the power to
determine districting plans in the state. The politicians affiliated with the
majority-holding party have strong incentives to influence districting plans
to ensure seats via votes. In the early 19th century, states were required to
choose when and how to redistrict and when a new party captured control
of the state government and the “probability of a redistricting event spiked.”
(21) The goal was, and still is to this day, to maximize the number of seats
Voting Patterns in the United States
their party couldwin on Election Day. For example, in the April 1892 volume,
the Atlantic Monthly wrote that Democratic voters in Kansas “have no more
hope of being represented in Congress at Washington than if they had no
vote at all.” (21) This was due to gerrymandering. Since districting plans
fundamentally alter the course of public policy and have lasting effects on
American politics, it is critical to ensure an equal opportunity for all votes to
have equal weight in an election.
Due to minorities tending to vote Democrat, in 1995 the Supreme Court
ruled in Miller v. Johnson that race can continue to be a factor in drawing
districts as long as the primary reasoning behind the districting is partisan-
ship rather than race (21). Race can be a factor in designing a districting
plan but cannot be the predominant factor. Since minority populations are
predominantly Democratic voters, implicit racial gerrymandering can still
be used. This means that, although racial gerrymandering is illegal by the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 passed by Congress with the intention of reversing
the systematic disenfranchisement of African Americans primarily in the
South, racial gerrymandering can be masked by partisan gerrymandering
(21). Before the Voting Rights Act, parties were more likely than their
current-day parties to draw districting plans with competitive congressional
districts in order to guarantee a boost in the number of seats they held (21).
2.2 Voting Patterns in the United States
Gerrymandered districting plans are based off of demographic data about
who votes, where they vote, and who they vote for. By using this data, those
who draw districting plans can do so in such a way that packs and cracks
certain groups to disable their voting power and maximize seats for the
given political party. Before diving into how to identify a gerrymandered
plan, we must have a deeper understanding of voting in the United States.
We analyze the example of the 2012 and 2016 presidential elections
compared to previous elections. Though this data is dated, as we approach
the 2020 presidential election it becomes increasingly important to know
voter demographics. Voter demographics grant us the knowledge of who
votes and what to expect in the upcoming election. An estimated 93 million
eligible citizens did not vote in the 2012 presidential election (22) which is
equivalent to 57.2 percent of eligible citizens voting, a decrease from the
2008 presidential election that saw 62.3 percent of eligible citizens voting
(22). Hawaii had the lowest overall state turnout of eligible voters with the
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count being at 43.6 percent. According to Ronald Brownstein at The Atlantic,
in 2016, the Census calculated that nearly two-thirds of eligible white voters
cast a ballot, African American turnout dropped to 59 percent, and Latino
turnout remained at around 48 percent (9). These voting patterns extend
beyond race to age. About 46 percent of eligible voters under 30 turned
out which was far below the involvement of those 45 and older. Similarly,
voting patterns extend to education levels. According to calculations done
by Michael McDonald, a University of Florida political scientist, about 45
percent of eligible white voters without a college degree voted (9). Those
creating gerrymandered plans can use this data to place voters in certain
districts based on their demographic’s voting patterns.
Knowing the growth possibility of a previously underutilized demo-
graphic can benefit those desiring gerrymandered districting plans because
they can plan accordingly for the size of districts. Among voting patterns
across race, age and education level there is also a question of sex. When
women were granted the right to vote, the Census Bureau had yet to track
voter turnout which means there is no data on the pace at which women
began practicing their right to vote (34). The Census Bureau began tracking
voter turnout in 1964. Luckily, in 1920 federal census data and local voting
records trackedChicagoans. That data shows that 46 percent ofwomen voted
in the presidential election compared to 75 percent of men. And although
not on the presidential election level, in the 1923 Chicago mayoral election,
35 percent of eligible women voted compared to 63 percent of men (34).
Two main factors played into the lack of eligible women voters: “disbelief
in woman’s voting” (34) and “objections of husband.”(34) Compared to
17.2 percent of men, 32.8 percent of the female respondents in the study
claimed their main reason for not voting was because of general reluctance
to engage with politics or to the particular election that year (34). Fast
forwarding 60 years, in 1980, 59.4 percent of eligible women voted in the
presidential election compared to 59.1 percent of eligible men (34). This
drastic difference illustrates the capacity of women voters and the ability to
captivate a previously underutilized group of potential voters. Furthermore,
since the 1980 presidential election, the proportion of eligible female voters
has exceeded the proportion of eligible male voters (6). Nowadays, women
tend to vote in higher numbers than men. Part of this could be due in part
because women constitute more than half of the population in the United
States. In recent elections, women cast almost ten million more votes than
men (6). Although there is no difference between a ballot cast by a woman
than by a man, it is essential to understand demographic voting trends
Counting Population in the United States
over time in order to understand how districts can be constructed when
redistricting.
According to Brownstein at The Atlantic, the 2020 presidential election
voter turnout is estimated to exceed previous voting records from past
decades, if not the past century (9). The new generation of eligible voters are
potentially producing the most diverse electorate in American history. The
Democratic voter-targeting firm Catalist projected that about 156 million
people may vote in the fall, a 17 million person increase from the 2016
presidential election. With this surge of new and old voters alike, the
demographic data becomes essential to understanding the outcome of the
election. Michael McDonald, a political scientist at University of Florida,
estimates that upwards of two-thirds of eligible voters may vote this fall.
If this ends up being the case, the 2020 presidential election would be the
highest presidential-year voter turnout since 1908, when 65.7 percent of
eligible Americans voted. With this increase in voter turnout comes a new
level of responsibility. The stakes for gerrymandered plans are high because
a presidential election brings the possibility of a surge in turnout. With a
surge in turnout comes more informed demographic voting trends and thus
higher stakes in how the data is used to redistrict.
2.3 Counting Population in the United States
There are many ways to count the population of a state in order to calculate
how to draw district lines. This is important because districts should have
equal populations, as ruled by the SupremeCourt case inWestberry v. Sanders
(1964). The current population calculator is Total Population (TPOP) which
was determined by the Supreme Court. TPOP, as the name suggests, counts
the total population of the state regardless of age or citizenship. Between
TPOP and Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP) lies Total Voting Age
Population (TVAP or VAP). TVAP disregards citizenship but counts for age.
People living in the United States who are of eligible voting age are counted
under TVAP (2).
One population counting method that is not in practice is the Citizen
Voting Age Population (CVAP). CVAP counts the number of citizens eligible
to vote as means of calculating population. This strategy effectively disre-
gards underage folks as well as folks who are not legally citizens. The total
CVAP is used by a state to create the ideal district population for each district.
Then, using this information, each district’s variance from the ideal district
10 Gerrymandering, Voting, and the Use of Data in Redistricting in the United States
population would calculate both the least and most populous district and
would also compute the total percentage deviation for a redistricting plan as
a whole (2). By using the total CVAP, there is an account for the prisoners in
the state. This practice is often referred to as “prison adjustment”(2) where
the prisoner count goes towards where the person lived before incarceration
and not towards the district in which the prison resides. The practice of
prisoner adjustment is generally believed to be favorable to Democrats be-
cause the count does not inflate the district’s population to that of those who
cannot vote due to incarceration. However, this depends on the locations of
the prisons and is still tied to total population (2).
Additionally, in order to achieve an accurate calculation of CVAP, there
must be a citizenship on the 2020 Decennial Census questionnaire (2). The
census is important for understanding how to draw a districting plan because
it determineswho gets countedwithin the population. The suggestion to add
a citizen question on the census by President Trump was quickly dismantled.
Unsurprisingly, switching to the use of CVAP “would be advantageous to
Republicans and Non-Hispanic Whites.” (2) Thus, at least in the near future,
CVAP will not be the new standard when redistricting.
Since the United States uses TPOP, to jump to CVAP as the new standard
“would be a high leap” (2). Although the manner in which population is
counted to establish a new standard for redistricting is important, the party
who controls the actual line-drawing process in most instances, possesses
a huge advantage that outweighs almost all other factors influencing the
redistricting process (2). In general, it matters more who redistricts and not
how.
2.4 Automatic Voting Registration (AVR)
In order to ensure a standard for redistricting such as CVAP, TVAP, or TPOP
works, there must be voters themselves. Many states are brainstorming and
implementing registration efforts. Knowing the constituents who vote helps
design districting plans and the more people who vote leads to a deeper and
better understanding of voting patterns. One way to increase the number
of voters is Automatic Voter Registration (AVR). According to Nathaniel
Rakich at FiveThirtyEight, around 16 states plus the District of Columbia
have enacted (though in several cases, not yet implemented) some version
of AVR (33). AVR creates an opt-out system rather than an opt-in system
that is in place in most states. The state, often through the Department of
Automatic Voting Registration (AVR)
Motor Vehicles (DMV), automatically registers eligible citizens when they
first interact with a government agency.
Evidence exists that AVR works, although it is unknown how many
people registered themselves or updated their registrations on their own.
In general, “people who were registered through AVR do vote – but not
necessarily at the same rate as those who register themselves.”(33) In D.C. in
2018, between 42 and 54 percent of people registered through AVR voted.
Comparatively, between 46 and 76 percent of those who did not register
through AVR cast ballots (33). The latter data does not account for those
whose registrations may have been updated by AVR.
Oregon serves as an example of AVR’s possibilities. On March 16, 2015,
the Governor Kate Brown historically signed the nation’s first AVR lawwhich
resulted in a jump from 73 percent of eligible voters registered in 2014 up to
90 percent by the 2018 election. That leap was the “most voters per capita
per day of any jurisdiction” (33) in the researchers’ sample. The caveat is that
people are not offered an opt out possibility at the time of their transaction
but instead have 21 days to return a notice to cancel their registration. In
contrast, most other states ask people if they want to opt out at the time of
the transaction itself. The lack of offering an opt out of registration may lead
to someone being unaware of their registration status. In Oregon, voting
registration records are public and include home addresses unless the person
filled out an application form to keep their information confidential. This
can potentially lead to dangerous situations for victims of domestic violence
or stalking (33).
Other areas in theUnited States such asD.C., Rhode Island, andCalifornia
have utilized AVR differently than Oregon. Councilmember Charles Allen
introduced AVR to D.C. and attributes the high turnout rate due to AVR to
the fact that before an election each district sends individualized postcards
to each registered voter as a reminder to vote. In Rhode Island, the DMV
employee asks the customer if they want to opt out of AVR. In theory, this
makes it more likely for those who decide not to opt out to know that they are
registered and, in turn, more likely to vote when in comparison to Oregon.
In the case of California, the state was woefully unprepared for utilizing
AVR. Employees were not trained and the outdated computer system the
department described as “a 40-year-old dinosaur" (33) was not equipped
to handle AVR. California exposed itself to hackers, glitches, and failure
to register people in time to vote, resulting in a mess which serves as a
cautionary tale of how AVR can create serious problems when government
agencies are not competent.
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With the positive intention of increasing those who vote comes with
downsides. One of which is that AVR assumes that the main reason people
do not vote is because they are not registered, which ignores other possible
explanations. Costs and benefits must be weighed, but it is very likely that
AVR leads to higher turnout for people whose information is made up to
date, which in turn makes it easier to contact them and urge them to vote.
Thus, the increase in people who vote, the higher the impact of elections and
the more thorough understanding of voting patterns (33).
2.5 Thomas Hofeller: The Power of Data
To understand the drastic implications of gerrymandering, we look to
Thomas Hofeller as a prominent example. His story illustrates how grand a
scale the problem of gerrymandering. Hofeller utilized citizen population
and voting data to his advantage and to the advantage of the Republic party
(GOP). Hofeller recently passed away and the legacy of his actions remains
pertinent to understanding gerrymandering.
2.5.1 Who he was
General
ThomasHofeller, or asDavidDaley atThe New Yorker called the “master of the
modern gerrymander” (15), was a Republican Party operative known for his
ability to create Republican-winning districting plans. During presentations
to other GOP operatives and legislators, he often emphasized caution over
protecting information stored and sent on computers. He stressed secure
computer networks, never sending emails that should not be made public,
keeping computers in private locations, and never leaving work exposed.
In training sessions his PowerPoints would say “avoid recklessness” (15),
“alwaysbediscreet” (15) andwarned that “emails are the tool of thedevil.”(15)
He argued that “Redistricting is one of the most profitable and business like
investments that the GOP can make. Even if it results in only the gain or
preservation of one or two additional congressional seats for 10 years, it is
more than worth this investment.”(17) A large number of white conservative
Republicans and a small number of progressive minorities replaced white
moderate Democrats in his gerrymandered plans.
Thomas Hofeller: The Power of Data
Profit
Hofeller did not draw redistricting plans simply for the benefit of the
Republican party, rather his talents came at a high price. According to a
letter from 2014 reported by Daley at The Intercept, his fee started at $7, 500
and he capped his price at $16, 000, or $200 an hour for a maximum of eighty
hours (17). Knowing that he could end up in court, he charged an additional
$325 per hour for depositions and trial testimony. His time included project
management and the production of tables and maps. Between the years
2011 and 2017, Hofeller billed the Republican party, including national
Republican organizations, tens of thousands of dollars. The sheer amount
of money that was spent on Hofeller’s skills magnifies the extent in which
people were, and are, willing to go to ensure a winning seat.
Travel
Hofeller travelled throughout the country and did not stay within one state
or region of the country. As reported by Daley, more than two dozen of
Hofeller’s PowerPoint presentations indicate that he travelled across the
nation throughout 2009, 2010, and 2011 emphasizing the importance of
redistricting in conversations with state legislators (14). Though Hofeller
may not have met directly with legislators, he met with party officials
responsible for drawing the plans and guided them towards the legislative
process. The lack of Hofeller’s localization reveals how immense of an issue
gerrymandering is and how widespread his actions were.
CVAP / Prison Gerrymandering
According to Daley at The New Yorker, Hofeller was a supporter of drawing
districts using Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP) (15). He was a part
of the Republican effort to add a citizenship question to the 2020 census,
a detail necessary for the use of CVAP. He encouraged the use of prison
gerrymandering, an element of CVAP, which counts incarcerated persons
who cannot vote. This allowed state legislative lines to be drawn based on
the number of citizen voters, which Hofeller argued made it easier to pack
Democrats and minorities into fewer districts, which in turn provided an
advantage to Republicans.
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Hofeller in Trump Era
Hofeller held confidence in the strength of his districting plans but e-mail
exchanges in 2016 reported by Daley demonstrate that he was concerned
about the repercussions of an anti-Trump wave that could shift state leg-
islature to Democrats. In an e-mail to a consultant to California Senate
Republicans in August 2016, Hofeller expressed frustration about Trump’s
hold over the Republican Party. However, he maintained his confidence
that his maps would endure any transferal of power over to Democrats. He
called Trump “only a product to this stupidity”(15) and wrote “Even in the
coming political bloodbath we should still maintain majority control of the
General Assembly.”(15) He mocked Democrats and claimed they hold on to
the “hope [that] the Obamista judiciary will come to their rescue.” (15)
2.5.2 Death and Documents
As reported by The Intercept, in August 2018 after Hofeller passed away,
all of this information was made public by Hofeller’s daughter, Stephanie,
when she discovered backups of over 70,000 of his files (14). She contacted
Common Cause, a watchdog organization that works on voting rights, who
in turn, subpoenaed her to provide them. A handful were made public,
including files that led to the removal of President Trump’s citizenship
question on the 2020 census. Geographic Strategies, a consulting firm co-
founded by Hoeller, then sued to prevent more files from entering the public
sphere. In early November 2019, a state court in North Carolina ruled tens
of thousands of Hofeller’s files be made public. Included in those files was
his work on maps as well as litigation in states including Texas, Missouri,
Arizona, Virginia, Alabama, Massachusetts, Florida, and North Carolina,
among others. The state court did not release all of the files; nearly 1,000
files will remain confidential that were specifically Hofeller’s. Litigation
continues over an additional 135,000 files Geographic Strategies claims as
its own. Common Cause released a statement after the court ruling stating,
“Now the truth can come out about all of Hofeller’s shocking efforts to rig
elections in almost every state.”(14).
2.5.3 Content of Hard Drives
Contents of his files show that Hofeller was involved in more redistricting
cycles than previously imagined. He was already known for limiting the
impact of voters of color in North Carolina, Texas, Missouri, and Virginia,
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and new documents showed he participated in the 2010 redistricting cycle
in Alabama, Florida and West Virginia (13). In a New Yorker report, his files
suggest he was deeply involved in GOP mapmaking nationwide and could
lead to more investigations over gerrymandered plans. Contents of his
files show that dating back to 2011 Hofeller estimated the CVAP in North
Carolina, Texas, and Arizona, among other states, even though drawing
maps based off of this is illegal (15).
Some of Hofeller’s memos explicitly stated the connection between race
and redistricting, an illegal tactic when redistricting, within the Republican
strategists at the highest level of the national party. The goal for Republican
strategists was to exploit the creation of “majority-minority” seats. The
strategy was to pack black voters into a limited number of seats and equate
Democrats and minorities in the minds of white voters, especially in the
South. Furthermore, some memos showed that top GOP leaders from many
states recognized that when they gained control over state legislatures, they
also gained control over redistricting. The memos specifically mentioned
Michigan, Pennsylvania, Florida, North Carolina, Texas, Ohio, Wisconsin,




In 2010, a state constitutional amendment barred partisan gerrymandering
in Florida. Yet, as The New Yorker reports, e-mails and files show that Hofeller
communicated with and visited top GOP political operatives in Florida
in 2011 (15). As reported by David Daley at The Intercept, Hofeller’s files
contained mapping software programmed with Florida residents’ addresses
and a spreadsheet from July 2011 named “Florida Minority Senate Data.”
(13) Though the rows are not labeled, Daley argues that they appear to
show minority voting strength across a dozen state Senate districts. The
operatives helped organize or draw state legislative and congressional
maps that matched the districts that were later enacted. At a trial, the
operatives unironically insisted that drawing themaps wasmerely a “hobby"
(13). This did not convince the federal district court judge who, in 2016,
concluded that the GOP conducted a stealth redistricting operation that
snuck unconstitutionally partisan gerrymandered maps into the public
process, a decision upheld by the United States Supreme Court which, in
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June 2019, ruled that the congressional map was a partisan gerrymander.
North Carolina
North Carolina, a competitive purple state, has a history of gerrymandering.
A purple state means that the state is divided in Republican and Democratic
votes. The state’s congressional districting map drawn in 2011 was thrown
out for unconstitutional racial gerrymandering. North Carolina Republicans
claimed that the maps discriminated based on partisanship, not race (15).
But in states where minority voters are often Democratic voters, a partisan
gerrymander can become a legal way to draw a racial gerrymander. It can be
incredibly difficult to distinguish between the two. Thus, in 2016, Rep. David
Lewis and the North Carolina legislature contacted Hofeller to redraw the
congressional lines. As reported in October, 2019 by Daley at The Intercept,
Hofeller drafted maps that would give Democrats only one or two seats (16).
A review of the records and e-mails found in Hofeller’s files raise questions
about whether Hofeller unconstitutionally used race data to draw North
Carolina’s congressional districts.
However, Hofeller was involved with North Carolina years before he
was contacted by Lewis. In February 2016, a panel of three federal district
court judges struck down his 2011 map as a racial gerrymander in violation
of the 14th Amendment’s “one person one vote” protections (16). Hofeller
was undeterred. Within a week after the ruling, Hofeller returned to
drawing districting maps with the intention of portraying them as partisan
gerrymandered (16).
Immediately following the ruling, Hofeller’s hard drive was filled with
possibilities for North Carolina districting plans. According to Daley at
The Intercept, one of his maps labeled Plan 17A, created 11 GOP districts,
guaranteed Democrats one district, and included one toss-up seat that re-
mained 49.5 percent Republican (16). This plan packs more North Carolina
Democrats into a single seat that would be, according to Hofeller’s calcu-
lations, 72.1 percent Democrat and just 27.9 percent Republican. Thus, the
Democratic vote is packed. A second map, labeled Plan ST-B, gave 10 seats
to Republicans, two to Democrats, and one competitive district with again a
49.5 percent GOP population. All of his plans appear reasonable on their
face. They hold counties together, appear contiguous, and score well on
compactness tests, according to Daley (16). The maps pass both the eye test
and state legal standards, while still providing Republicans as many as 10
or 11 reliable victories. Though none of Hofeller’s aggressive plans were
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used, they indicate the extreme possibilities for redistricting with new-age
technologies and mapmaking software.
As reported by The New Yorker, Hofeller’s congressional districting plan
was “perhaps one of the clearest and ugliest gerrymanders in North Carolina
– or in the entire nation”(15), specifically the congressional-district line that
severs the nation’s largest historical black college. North Carolina A&T State
University in Greensboro, a majority minority campus, was cut in half in
such a precise way that it all but guarantees the college will be represented in
Congress by two Republicans for years to come. North Carolina Republicans
have long denied the intentionality of diluting black voting power by
cracking the university into two districts which is unconstitutional racial
gerrymandering. The map also cracks liberal Asheville in two, thus diluting
the voting power of Democrats.
Hofeller’s files prove what was so long thought of as unconstitutional
racial gerrymandering by voting rights advocates but there was little proof
of it. He created giant databases that detailed the racial makeup, voting
patterns, and residence halls of more than a thousand North Carolina A&T
students (15). He also tracked data from tens of thousands of college students
across North Carolina concerning their race, voting patterns, and addresses.
Some of his spreadsheets have more than fifty different fields for racial,
gender, and geographic information, solely for the thousands of college
students. He cross-referenced the students’ information against the state
driver’s license files to determine whether these students likely possessed
the proper identification to vote. North Carolina Republicans had recently
passed one of the strictest voter I.D. laws in the country which rejected forms
of identification often used by students, government employees, and racial
minorities. Hofeller used the fact that college students and people of color
tend to vote Democratic so by organizing them into ability to vote he was
able to crack left-leaning communities.
His hard drive contained maps of Greensboro titled “Greensboro Master
Race”, “Greensboro - Pct Blk - City Only VAP,” “Greensboro 45+ BVAP
Compactness” and “Greensboro 50+ BVAP Compactness.”(15) BVAP is
the black voting-age population, meaning the number of eligible to vote
African-Americans. Also found in Hofeller’s hard drive was a map of
North Carolina’s 2017 state judicial gerrymander with the black voting-age
population by district overlaid on it. Using an algorithm he had carefully
curated, Hofeller believed he could accurately predict the outcome of any
North Carolina race. He had created maps that he predicted would turnout
a 11-2 or even 12-1 Republican map. In his response to the court ruling
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that his map was an unconstitutional racial gerrymandering, he turned
around and drew an even more partisan map that could have elected an
all-white delegation. He referred to the congressional map as a solution to
the “problem we should be able to remedy.” (14)
2.6 Reaction to Gerrymandering Allegations
Unsurprisingly, as reported in The Intercept by David Daley, many top
Republicans deny in court and in public that gerrymandering gives them any
advantage over Democrats (17). In 2017, Chris West, the spokesperson for
former Republican Virginia Speaker of the House William Howell, claimed
that “The problem is not district lines; the problem is weak candidates
who run poor campaigns based on bad ideas,” (17) suggesting Democratic
candidates are weaker. Furthering this idea, also in 2017, Wisconsin state
Rep. Kathleen Bernier, a Republican, told the Wall Street Journal “We have
better candidates, better issues, and a better understanding of what our
constituents want to do.”(17) Additionally, top Republican strategists and
political operatives have admitted to exploiting racial data and the Voting
Rights Act in order to flip the South red and tilt electoral maps in their
direction (17). However, gerrymandering is not partisan, though Hofeller
may have amplified Republicans’ data collection for gerrymandered plans.
Massachusetts fell under scope for Democratic partisan gerrymander but
as discussed later, was found not to be a gerrymander. Similarly, Maryland
was argued to be a Democratic partisan gerrymander and the results are
currently inconclusive. This illustrates the necessity of unbiased nonpartisan




Non-partisan voting rights advocates recently began using to use math to
detect and quantify gerrymandering. The goal is to find a direct and nearly
unbiased way to provide evidence of gerrymandered plans so that they can
be brought to court and no longer be in use. Though there were some trial
and errors with which mathematical methods to use, each method showed
that the progress already made and the progress in which we need to work
towards.
3.1 North Carolina: Markov chains and Flip Walks
In this section we discuss Hofeller’s engagement with North Carolina
redistricting and how it was brought to court, along with the math that
supported the rulings. In both a state court ruling and the Supreme Court.
A research group with Duke University used Markov chains with Flips to
provide evidence that the plans were gerrymandered.
3.1.1 North Carolina State Court Ruling
In September 2019, a state court threw out the North Carolina congressional
districting map drawn in 2016 for being an unconstitutional partisan gerry-
mander favoring Republicans (17). The state was carefully curated to adhere
to a Republican dominance but that was upended. The House map drawn
by Republicans, and now known to be highly involved with Hofeller, all but
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guaranteed the party’s control of 10 of the state’s 13 House districts (16).
However, if Democrats continued to win about half of the statewide vote
under a fair map, they couldwin at least six out of the state’s 13 congressional
seats, which is three more than they have right now (16). Those seats could
increase the Democrat’s majority in the House of Representatives in 2020 or
potentially give Democrats control of the chamber.
In 2016, one of the map’s drafters now-famously boasted that he had
given Republicans a 10-to-3 edge in seats “because I do not believe it’s
possible to draw a map with 11 Republicans and two Democrats.” (36) Mark
Joseph Stern reports that upon presenting the plan, the legislature in charge
of redistricting stated “I think electing Republicans is better than electing
Democrats”, “so I drew this map to help foster what I think is better for the
country.”(35)
The three-judge state court ruled that the map cannot be used in the
2020 election. Even if the 2020 primaries are delayed, the importance lies in
a lawful election. The state panel stated that the map violated provisions
in North Carolina’s Constitution, such as freedom of speech and assembly
and equal protection under the law, which protects citizens’ “right to vote
on equal terms.”(35) The state panel also noted that the map violated the
guarantee of free elections. This decision to invalidate the state’s current
maps wreaks havoc on the voting process just months before congressional
candidates must be elected from districts that no longer exist. Reported
by The Intercept, the most likely approach now is that the state legislatures
will need to quickly draw and win court approval of new maps. The
court “respectfully urges the General Assembly to adopt an expeditious
process” of redistricting “that ensures full transparency and allows for
bipartisan participation and consensus.” (35) Michael Wines with the New
York Times reports that in attempts to appear non-biased, party leaders
publicly announced they would redraw the map using partisan rather than
racial parameters (36).
3.1.2 Post State Court Ruling, United States Supreme Court Rul-
ing
In January 2018, according to The New York Times, the US Supreme Court
refused to invalidate this exact same gerrymander in Rucho v. Common Cause
(28). The United States Supreme Court temporarily blocked the trial court’s
order requiring a revised congressional districting map in North Carolina.
The state court’s decision to invalidate this plan is a test case for the fight
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against partisan gerrymandering. Wines writes, “it has been a triumph for
voting rights.” (35) According to Adam Liptak and Alan Blinder with The
New York Times, the United States Supreme Court has never struck down a
voting map as an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander but has done so in
regards to racial gerrymandering (28). J. Michael Bitzer, a political scientist at
Catawba College in North Carolina, said the Supreme Court’s order was an
important, if perhaps temporary, win for Republicans in North Carolina (28).
The Democrat lawyers’ brief stated that “the Republican contingent of the
legislature wants to enjoy the fruits of their grossly unconstitutional actions
for yet another election cycle.”(28) The state legislature ultimately settled
on the 10-3 districting map. According to The Intercept, in 2018 Democrats
won their districts with 69.9, 75.1, and 73.1 percent of the vote, while every
Republican running a contested race landed safely in the 50s (16). Though
Democrats won more total votes, the map spread Republican votes more
effectively and efficiently, guaranteeing a Republican win.
3.1.3 Mathematics Analysis of 2017 North Carolina General As-
sembly Districting Plan
In September 2019, Jonathon Mattingly with the nonpartisan research group
at Duke University called Quantifying Gerrymandering, published an article
outlining the group’s analysis of the 2017 North Carolina General Assembly
redistricting plan (30). By representing the state as a graph and each node
as a precinct, the group was able to mathematically quantify the districting
plan.
Through the use of Markov chains to build a baseline to compare to,
Mattingly’s group used the common Flip walk, which randomly changes the
district of of a single node at a time. This method is slow and offers no proof
of whether or not it is mixing fast, meaning we sample from something close
to intended distribution or not. However, one of their central findings was
that the legislature’s redistricting plan implemented a firewall to protect
Republican majorities and supermajorities. Linked on their site, Quantifying
Gerrymandering illustrates the range of Democratic seat counts shifted
with the statewide fraction of Democratic votes under various shifts to
historical elections through an animated bar-graph. The group emphasizes
the United States Senate vote in 2016. When the statewide Democratic
vote fraction is below 49 percent the enacted plan elects a typical number
of Democrats when compared to the ensemble the group created. When
the Democratic vote fraction increases to 50.5 percent and over 52 percent,
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almost all of the plans in the ensemble break the Republican supermajority.
However, the enacted plan continues to elect fewer than 48 Democrats to
the state House. Furthermore, as the Democratic vote fraction increases to
54.5 percent, the enacted plan elects fewer Democrats than the ensemble
where nearly all of the plans in the ensemble predict a Democratic majority
in the House. When the Democratic vote fraction surpasses 55 percent,
plans in the ensemble illustrate a strong majority to the Democrats yet the
Republicans retain their majority in the enacted plan. Consistently, as the
Democratic vote fraction increases, the enacted plan elects fewer Democrats
than the ensemble. Quantifying Gerrymandering strongly emphasizes the
fact that “the story is NOT about proportional representation”(30), but
rather about how the 2017 North Carolina General Assembly districting
plan systematically under-elects Democrats “to a shocking degree.”(30) The
group continues with examples from the 2008 United States Senate votes,
the 2012 Governor election, and the 2016 Lt. Governor votes all in North
Carolina, all intentional partisan gerrymandering that cannot be explained
away by natural packing due to geography. Mattingly and his co-researhcers
end the article by saying “if you are worried about the state of our democracy,
you should be.”(30)
3.2 Maryland: Markov Chains and Flip Walks
Similar to Massachusetts, Maryland is highly contested for having ger-
rymandered districts in favor of Democrats. In an interview with Lulu
Garcia-Navarro on NPR in January 2018, state Delegate Kirill Reznik, a
Democrat, argued that he does not support Republican Governor Larry
Hogan’s proposals to change the process of redistricting (23). He argued
that since he thinks there are more states that have a Republican redistricting
problem than a Democratic one, before implementing an independent com-
mission like California, Virginia must do so as well. His idea is that to be fair
and equitable, a Republican-dominant state with a potential gerrymandering
issue must also commit to creating an independent commission to redraw
districts.
Mattingly, with Quantifying Gerrymandering, has informally conducted
research using Flips on Maryland (25). He and his fellow researchers are
inconclusive in their results (25). However in November 2018, a three-judge
federal court panel ruled that after the 2010 Census the state unconstitu-
tionally drew districts to benefit Democrats (7). Late last March in 2019, an
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attorney representing a group of Maryland Republicans urged the United
States Supreme Court to end the practice of drawing sharply partisan con-
gressional districts. Some of the justices appeared hesitant to rule in an area
that for a long time in the domain of states. In the arguments, Maryland
Attorney General Brian Frosh claimed hewas not defending gerrymandering
but rather wanted the Supreme Court to establish rules and standards when
Maryland redraws the map. Former Maryland Secretary of State John Willis
provided historical information to the state about the case and he posed the
question, “whatever the result, the real question for the court is, ‘Should
the judiciary get engaged more than it has previously?’”(7) His question
indicates the thin line separating national versus state judiciary andmirrored
some of the justices’ reactions to rule in this case. Representative David
Trone, a Democrat who holds Maryland’s 6th District seat, furthered the
posed question when he disagreed with the lower court’s ruling and said
that a national solution to gerrymandering isn’t just necessary, it is required.
3.3 Wisconsin: Efficiency Gap
Unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering canbe extremelydifficult to detect.
To diminish this difficulty, Mira Bernstein and Moon Duchin, mathematics
researchers, used a simple formula called the efficiency gap (EG) (8). Though
not used in this thesis, the EG’s goal is to detect and reject gerrymandered
congressional and legislative maps that are aimed at keeping one party
dominant over another. EG does not require multiple elections to pull data
from, it can be computed based on a single election. If the result surpasses a
certain threshold, then the districting plan is found to have a discriminatory
partisan effect and is therefore determined gerrymandered. According to
Bernstein and Duchin, the efficiency gap fundamentally measures whether
the seat share S is close to 2V – 1/2 , where V is the vote share (8). The
efficiency gap, EG = 2V – S – 1/2 arguably can identify a legally actionable
gerrymander when its magnitude is greater than 8 percent. Bernstein and
Duchin note that the EG formula counts wasted votes for the winning or
losing side, such as votes lost in the impacts of packing and cracking, to be in
excess of the 50 percent needed to win. To determine the difference between
packed and cracked districts, the EG looks at which side, winning or losing,
wasted votes were located. If majority of all of the wasted votes belong
to the winning side, then the district is packed. If majority of the wasted
votes belong to the losing side, then the district is competitive. Alternatively,
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if there are multiple adjacent districts where the majority of wasted votes
belong to the losing side, then there’s a possibility the districting plan is
cracked. If the EG is nearly zero, then the plan is fair, meaning that both
parties waste about an equal number of votes. Surprisingly, EG does not
penalize packing, cracking, or peculiarly-shaped districts. EG is not a perfect
solution to detecting gerrymandered plans; it has undesirable properties
and limitations that make it not reliable. Although EG is attractive in its
simple construction, especially to legal scholars, it is still in its beginning
stages of statistical testing and modeling.
InNovember 2016 for the first time in 30 years, a federal court inWisconsin
overturned a legislative map as an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander
(8). One of the main central focuses in the district court’s ruling was the high
efficiency gap in Wisconsin’s 2012 to 2016 elections that favored Republicans.
Due to the extremity of this case and the novelty of the EG data, this case
is under appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court’s ruling could
determine a standardization for detecting gerrymandered plans in the future.
3.4 Pennsylvania: Significance Without Mixing
Pennsylvania, like the other states examined in this chapter, has a history
of gerrymandering. According to the Voting Rights Data Institute at Tufts
University, in February 2018, two districting plans for Pennsylvania were
submitted; one by Governor Tom Wolf, a Democrat, and one by Speaker
Michael Turzai and President Pro Tem Joe Scarnati, both Republicans
(5). Wolf’s plan was fair, constitutional, avoids cracking, packing, and
unnecessary splitting of regions. On the contrary, Turzai and Scarnati’s
plan is an extreme outlier among redistricting plans, according to a detailed
analysis and rigorous calculations by Moon Duchin, Association Professor
of Mathematics at Tufts University (20). Through production of three
billion maps that are at least as compact, preserve at least as many counties,
and keep population deviation within the one percent threshold, Duchin
claims that the Turzai-Scarnati plan is “overwhelmingly likely to have
been drawn to increase partisan advantage.” (20) She argues that there is
less than a 0.1 percent chance that the plan was drawn in a non-partisan
manner. Furthermore, she claims that in contrast, the GOV plan, Wolf’s
plan, “falls squarely within the ensemble of similar plans” (20) created using
non-partisan criteria and therefore indicates that the plan does not favor
Democrats.
Pennsylvania: Significance Without Mixing
Wes Pedgen has also usedmath to bring a Pennsylvanian gerrymandered
districting plan to court. AlthoughMarkov chains have proven themselves to
be an incredible asset to detecting and quantifying gerrymandered plans, in
some applications it is unknown how long a chain must run to generate good
samples. Often in practice, the required time is too long. The researchers
Chikina, Frieze, and Pegden have crafted a new test, still using Markov
chains (11). The test is not rigorous without good bounds on the mixing
time it takes for the Markov chain to generate samples.
Their tests runs from taking a random walk from the presented state for
any number of steps. They prove that an observation of the presented state
is an e-outlier on the walk is significant under the null hypothesis that the
state was chosen from a stationary distribution. The researchers assume
nothing about the Markov chain beyond reversibility (11).
The researchers explain how smaller tests can be conducted at the
district-level, where one can compare the difference between the mean and
median votes. If the difference is unusually large, then the plan may be
gerrymandered. Other ways of measuring district to district can be judged
based on generally reasonable differences in statistical properties. The re-
searchers tested their application on a rigorous detection of gerrymandering
in Congressional districting. As described in Chikina, Frieze, Mattingly,
and Pegden’s paper “Separating Effect from Significance in Markov Chain
Tests” (10), the math uses Markov chains to set a baseline with typical maps
where the invariant distribution is concentrated. From there, the group
argued that from there, one can rigorously assess the likelihood of choosing
a particular map. The researchers found that in Pennsylvania is 2012, 48.77
percent of voters were cast for Republican representatives and 50.20 percent
of voters were cast for Democrat representatives. The election resulted in 13
Republican representatives and 5 Democrat representatives. Thus, the state
“spectacularly” (10) failed their test.
Deceiving groups disguised as non-partisan organizations are known
to funnel money towards the creation of gerrymandered districting plans.
Pennsylvanians Against Gerrymander (PAG) was formed in August 2019 by
the Gober Group, an election law firm based in northern Virginia, according
to Peter Maass and Lee Fang at The Intercept (29). Kathryn Murdoch, the
daughter-in-law of Fox News founded Rupert Murdoch, is the co-chair and
largest donor to PAG. Their website, as documented by Maass and Fang,
states that PAG supports an independent commission to redraw federal
district lines in Pennsylvania after the 2020 Census (29). An independent
commission is a nonpartisan group who collectively create a districting
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plan. It is generally favored by advocates of voting reform and it is generally
regarded as the ideal way to draw fair plans rather than letting party
politicians control it. The rollout of the group was a silent one such that Pat
Beaty, the legislative director of the nonpartisan Fair Districts PA, “laughed
out loud” (29) when he read Unite America’s description of PAG as “leading
the legislative advocacy campaign” claiming that he had “never heard of
these people.”(29)
Contrary to public image, PAG is backed by GOP-inclined lobbyists
who fully wish to gerrymander the state into Republican majority. On
September 19, 2019, Unite America donated more than $5 million to PAG
and three groups that advocate for fairer redistricting in Massachusetts,
Alaska, and New York(29). Long, Nyquist & Associates and Maverick
Strategies, two of the most powerful lobbying firms in Pennsylvania, and
registered as working on behalf of PAG; yet, both firms are regarded as
GOP-inclined. Additionally, both firms employ lobbyists who were closely
linked to Republican engineered rigged election maps in Pennsylvania after
the 2000 and 2010 censuses.(29)
In 2011, Long, from Long, Nyquist & Associates, helped create All Votes
Matter, and organization designed to change the way the electoral votes
in the state are awarded. The system would ensure a Republican would
win the majority of Pennsylvania’s electoral college votes even if President
Barack Obama had won the state in his 2012 reelection. However, following
a national outcry, the All Votes Matter bid failed. Also in 2011, Krystjan
Callahan, the previous chief of staff for State Rep. Mike Turzai, was thanked
for his work in what election analyst Sean Trende called the “Gerrymander of
the Decade.”(29) The map was so carefully curated that in the 7th district the
city was only connected by a single steakhouse restaurant. The map placed
Democrats at a disadvantage and locked 13 House seats for Republicans.
In 2012, the map worked as intended. Now, Callahan is a lobbyist for PAG
through his work with Maverick Strategies.
Pennsylvanians Against Gerrymandering is not alone in its effort to
mask gerrymandering intentions. Apparently, Alan Philip, a contact on
PAG webpage for lobbying registration form and website registration, is a
Colorado-based Republican consultant who was involved in End Gerryman-
dering Now, a 2016 ballot measure attempt to reform Colorado’s redistricting
process. Themaskwas unveiledwhen The Colorado Independent, a left-leaning
news outlet, wondered if the group was “actually a nefarious Trojan Horse
plot to tint Colorado red?”(29) People were concerned that the group was a
stealth attempt by the GOP to craft rules that favored Republican candidates
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by insufficiently prioritizing district lines that preserve communities of
interest.
3.5 Massachusetts: Fairness vs. Proportionality
Massachusetts came under question when for the third Census cycle in a
row, the state held nine to ten seats in the House of Representatives. The
state is home to over 6.5 million people, which according to the 2010 Census
is up from 6.3 million people in the 2000 Census. This accounts to about
two to three percent of the United States’ population. After the 2010 Census,
the number of Congressional delegates allocated to Massachusetts dropped
by one because the state’s population did not keep pace with the nation’s.
According to Duchin et. al. in “Locating the Representational Baseline:
Republicans in Massachusetts” (19), the fact that the state holds up to ten
seats means that a district can be won with as little as 6 percent of the
statewide vote. The underperformance of Republicans in Massachusetts
elections is not owed to the lack of Republicans to field House candidates.
Rather these trends can be explained by using math to examine the physical
distribution of votes throughout the state. Though Republicans carry 30
to 35 percent of the votes statewide, they are so uniformly distributed that
there is no way to succeed in a majority. They represent an extreme that is
not common in many states in that the statewide percentage of Republicans
is the same in each town and precinct rather than having certain towns or
precincts having a higher percentage of Republican votes in the statewide
count.
The researchers figured out this crucial information about Massachusetts
by creating numerous districting plans and illustrating that to have Re-
publicans win would be such an extreme outlier it is nearly impossible
(19). The core of their analysis is a rigorous proof that regardless of the
districting plan, certain actual observed voting patterns guarantee this idea
of a lockout effect. Duchin et. al. assessed the numerical distribution of
votes in 13 statewide elections and found that in five of them, “the number
alone make it literally impossible to build a R-favoring collection of towns or
precincts with enough population to be a Congressional district.” (19) The
researchers reached the conclusion that extreme representational outcomes,
such as the case of Republicans in Massachusetts, are not always attributable
to gerrymandering nor to how voters from either party are arranged in
the state. To further their point, the researchers looked at the vote shares
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between George W. Bush and Al Gore. Bush received over 35 percent of the
two-way vote share against Al Gore; yet Duchin et. al. concluded that it
is “mathematically impossible to construct a collection of town, however
scattered, with at least 10 percent of the population and where Bush received
more collective votes than Gore.”(19)
As described in theWisconsin case, the EG is often an incredible resource
to detect a gerrymandered plan. Duchin et. al., note the special case of
Massachusetts and how EG cannot be universally used (19). They found
that in quintillions of possible 9-district plans, not a single plan has an EG
below 11 percent in any of the five races in which it was nearly impossible
to contrive a Republican-favoring plan. As mentioned previously, it was
argued that an EG with magnitude above 8 percent can be used to flag a
legally actionable gerrymander. Thus, the researchers conclude that it is
essential to understand the subtleties of establishing a reasonable baseline
to determine when gerrymandering has occurred (19).
In “A Computational Approach to Measuring Vote Elasticity and Com-
petitiveness” DeFord et. al. also uses Recombination, a method of using
Markov chains and spanning trees to establish a baseline to compare to, to
address the Massachusetts case (18). Issues with Recombination are the lack
of knowledge surrounding how well it mixes as well as not knowing what
the stationary distribution is. In the next section, we find the stationary
distribution for a previously unknown grid graph.
3.6 Virginia: Recombination
In June 2018, a District Court in Virginia ruled that 11 House of Delegates
districts were racial gerrymanders. The three judge panel found that
Black residents were isolated in packed districts, thus diluting their votes.
Statements in the court confirmed that the 2011 Enacted plan was designed
to have greater than or equal to 55 percent Black Voting Age Population
(BVAP) in 11 districts. This high elevation of BVAP suppressed the BVAP
level in 22 neighboring districts. According to the Voting Rights Act, the
range of BVAP values from 37 percent to 55 percent (3). The 2011 Enacted
plan was targeted to aim for districts above the 55 percent line.
The Metric Geometry and Gerrymandering Group (MGGG) published a
report in November 2018 regarding this gerrymander and titled their report
“Comparison of Districting Plans for the Virginia House of Delegates"(3).
They decided to use this Markov chain method to construct a baseline for
Virginia: Recombination
comparison in order to observe and quantify the tradeoff between elevated
BVAP in part of the map and broader effects on the districting outcomes (3).
Their Markov chain sampling process has population equality, contiguity,
and compactness built into the steps, making it a potentially more viable
option than the methods described in this chapter.
The researchers begin their algorithm starting from plans previously
proposed for adoption and 100 neutral maps. They then performed chains
of random alternations, collecting a large sample from the resulting maps as
their collection of comparable plans. They created a plot to depict the 20, 000
steps from a Recombination Markov chain, illustrating the plans that do not
exceed 60 percent BVAP. The plot diagram indicates evidence of where and
how elevating the BVAP in the top 12 districts suppresses the BVAP in the
remainder of the plans. Diluting the BVAP impacts not only the areas where
it was already very low but also affects districts that were at or nearing the
zone in which statistical analysis has indicated opportunities to elect more
candidates of choice for the Black community (3).
MGGG found that elevating BVAP in the 2011 Enacted plan causes at
least ten and up to 17 other districts to have suppressed BVAP levels, far
below what would be expected from race-neutral redistricting. The 2011
Enacted plan has no districts at all in the crucial range of 37 to 55 percent
BVAP, while neutral redistricting tells us to expect as many as ten (3).
Hundreds of thousands of race-neutral plans found by Markov chain
techniques indicate that without sacrificing population balance, contiguity,
or compactness, three additional districts are pushed over the BVAP level.
These methods suggest that a substantial share of race neutral plans that
comport with traditional districting principles would do so (3). Thus,
Recombination is an important tool to use when considering how to detect
and quantify gerrymandered plans.
Although Recombination was useful in Virginia, we do not know the
stationary distribution. This thesis finds the stationary distribution for a




Due to the recent development of math used to detect and quantify ger-
rymandering, there are many algorithms currently in use. Often these
algorithms use Markov chains, but not exclusively. As research accumulates,
each method shows its benefits as well as what it lacks. For the purposes
of this thesis, we studied Recombination, a Markov chain. There are many
advantages to using this method, however the problem is that the stationary
distribution is unknown in most cases. This is bad because we don’t know
the baseline we’re comparing to. We found the stationary distribution for
the four-by-four grid-graph case.
4.1 Markov Chains, Transition Matrix, State Spaces
AMarkov chain is a memoryless random process on a state space. AMarkov
chain is a process which moves among the elements of a set Ω by way of
probability. At a position G, the next position is chosen according to a fixed
probability distribution that depends only on G. The Markov chain is the
sequence of random variables of states visited, e.g. - i = state at step 8. The
memoryless transitions are based off a probability distribution. Memoryless
means they lack the ability to produce context-dependent content because
they cannot take into account previous states of being. A Markov chain can
be visualized as a weighted graph that can have loops and/or walks, where
the weights of the loops and walks are probabilities. Markov chains are
common in algorithms designed to identify gerrymandered plans because
they can quickly generate random samples from large spaces (27).
The probability distribution of state transitions is called the transition
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matrix. At each position within the transition matrix the entry at (8 , 9) =
%A>1(8 , 9), meaning the probability of where to go if at state 8. If the Markov
chain has # possible states, then the matrix will be of size # × # . Each row
in the transition matrix must sum to one because each row represents its
own probability distribution, thus making it a stochastic matrix.
A Markov chain also has an initial state vector, which is a 1 × # matrix.
Entry 8 of the vector describes the probability of the chain beginning at state
8. Then, the probability of moving from state 8 to state 9 over " steps must
be calculated.
In this thesis, the states are districting plans and there are 117 states, or
possibilities for district plans in this case, meaning the matrix is 117 × 117,
such that the entry (8 , 9) is the probability of transitioning from state 8 to
state 9. We calculate this value with code, linked in Chapter 5. Instead
of calculating the entry (8 , 8), which is the probability of going from one
districting plan to itself, we have calculated all other values and subtracted
that sum from one such that the matrix remains stochastic.
4.2 Stationary Distribution
The stationary distribution of a Markov chain is probability distribution ,
satisfying  = % where % is the transition matrix.
A Markov chain is irreducible if there is a sequence of valid transitions
from any state to any other state, meaning for all G, H ∈ Ω there is a C such
that %t(G, H) > 0. AMarkov chain is aperiodic if for all G ∈ Ω,
623{C : %t(G, G) > 0} = 1.
A Markov chain is ergodic if it is both irreducible and aperiodic. Any finite,
ergodic Markov chain converges to a unique stationary distribution given by





The stationary distribution is also modeled with the formula limC→∞ G0%t
when Markov chain is finite and ergodic.
In this thesis, we find  by solving % = , not by using the limit. As
opposed to repeatedly raising a matrix to a power, we use linear algebra to
solve for , which gives us our stationary distribution.
States as Graphs
4.3 States as Graphs
In nearly all mathematical methods of quantifying districting plans, states
are represented as graphs where vertexes are geographical units such as
census blocks or precincts. Often the nodes have population of the region
they are present in and the districting plan is a balanced partition, meaning
all districts within it are approximately equally sized. For this thesis, all
nodes have equal populations and plans must be exactly balanced.
4.4 Recombination
The Markov chain we study in this thesis is Recombination. Recombination
follows the structure that if in state 8, the next transition is determined by
the following algorithm:
1. Pick two random districts, uniformly from all pairs.
2. Take the union of those two districts.
3. Pick a random spanning tree, uniformly among all spanning trees.
4. Pick a uniformly random edge 4 of that spanning tree.
5. Use 4 to split the spanning tree.
6. If the two parts that are left are of the same size, make those parts into
new districts. Otherwise, remain at plan 8.
Each transition probability from 8 to 9 can be calculated exactly.
4.5 Kirchoff’s Matrix-Tree Theorem
Kirchoff’s Matrix-Tree Theorem is used to count the number of spanning
trees in a given graph. This theorem is used to compute entries of %. To
understand the theorem, we must define terms used in the theorem.
A spanning tree is a connected graph with no cycles. It is a spanning
tree of a graph  if it spans , that is, it includes every vertex of G, and is a
subgraph of  if every edge in the tree belongs to . A vertex set of G, with
+ = {E1 , . . . , E=} is a subgraph of a graph is a spanning tree if it is a tree that
contains every vertex in + . If the graph on = vertices with + = {E1 , . . . , E=}
then its graph Laplacian is an = × = matrix whose entries can have three
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cases. If 8 = 9, then the entry is the degree of that vertex. If 8 does not equal
9 and the two vertices are connected, then the entry is −1. Otherwise, the
entry is 0. Then, to find a minor of the Laplacian, one must take out any
row and any column from the Laplacian. Kirchoff’s Matrix-Tree Theorem
states that the determinant of any minor of the Laplacian is the number of
spanning trees of G. This gives us an efficient way to count the number of





We exactly calculated , the stationary distribution of Recombination, for
the 4 × 4 grid into four districts. The probabilities we found are organized
into four classes depending on the number of square districts in the plans.
These results are interesting because square districts have a larger amount
of spanning trees, thus increasing the probability. Our detailed results are
as follows.
Due to reflection and rotation not affecting the probability, we were able
to group the 117 districting plans into a total of 22 distinct weights. Each
group has a range from one to eight districting plans within it, depending
on its reflection and rotation abilities. In the case of the group having one
plan, it means that when rotated or reflected, the plan remains the same. All
values are in Table 5.1 to Table 5.4.
Out of the 22 distinct weights, we noticed that the values hovered around
four values, the smallest grouping of distinct weights is around 0.003 and
includes all the plans without a square district. We found that there are
14 values that fall within the 0.0030 to 0.0035 range. See Figure 5.1, which
shows the districting plan with the smallest probability out of the 22 distinct
weights. The distinct plan with the largest probability within this range has
a spiral-like structure, as seen in Figure 5.2.
The second smallest grouping of distinct weights is within the 0.0090
to 0.0092 range, about three times larger of a probability than the smallest
grouping. Each of these districting plans, of which there are four distinct
districting plans, has exactly one square district in it. See Figure 5.3,
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Figure 5.1 Smallest probability in all 22 distinct weights, probability =
0.0030503098, 8 rotations/reflections
Figure 5.2 Largest probability of the smallest grouping of distinct weights
without squares, probability = 0.0034370206, 2 rotations/reflections
Results
Figure 5.3 Smallest probability in second grouping of distinct weights with
one square, probability = 0.0090170844, 4 rotations/reflections
Figure 5.4, Figure 5.5, and Figure 5.6 for reference of each of the four distinct
weights within the second smallest grouping. Because the square graph has
more spanning trees, it makes sense why this group of plans has a higher
probability than the planswithout squares. The grouping of districting plans
that fall on the larger size with the probability value being 0.0092067382
could be larger than the others because the square district is in the corner of
the districting plan. It’s possible that this increases the probability because
there is more room within the remaining area of the districting plan for the
other districts to take a wider range of shapes. The grouping of districting
plans that falls on the smaller size within this second grouping with the
probability value 0.0090170844 has the square district in the middle of the
plan. Thus, this inhibits the potential range of shapes the other districts can
take.
The third grouping has three sets of districting plans with probabilities
ranging from 0.024 to 0.025. The probabilities within this grouping are eight
times larger than the smallest grouping. Every districting plans in this group
has two square districts. See Figure 5.7, Figure 5.8, and Figure 5.9 for each
of the three distinct ways to craft a plan with two square districts. Because
there are fewer ways to draw districting plans with two squares in it, there
are understandably fewer plans that hover around this range of probabilities.
The final grouping includes only one districting plan which is the plan
with four squares; see Figure 5.10. The probability for this plan far exceeds
the rest because of the fact that four square districts means more spanning
trees. Because there is only one way to draw a districting plan in a 4x4
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Figure 5.4 Second smallest probability in second grouping of distinct weights
with one square, probability = 0.0091650711, 4 rotations/reflections
Figure 5.5 Third smallest probability in second grouping of distinct weights
with one square, probability = 0.0091653883, 8 rotations/reflections
Results
Figure 5.6 Largest probability in second grouping of distinct weights with one
square, probability = 0.0092067382, 8 rotations/reflections
Figure 5.7 Smallest probability in third grouping of distinct weights with two
squares, probability = 0.0244428477, 2 rotations/reflections
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Figure 5.8 Second smallest probability in third grouping of distinct weights
with two squares, probability = 0.0245788627, 4 rotations/reflections
Figure 5.9 Largest probability in third grouping of distinct weights with two
squares, probability = 0.0245844451, 8 rotations/reflections
Methods
Figure 5.10 Largest probability in all 22 distinct weights, probability =
0.1966606746, 1 rotation/reflection
grid graph with four squares, there is only one districting plan with this
probability. This largest probability districting plan is 64 times larger than
the plans without any squares. This probability is also eight times larger
than probabilities of plans with two square districts.
Based off of these findings, we can conclude that square districts carry
more probability for the districting plan that a plan with no square districts.
This confirms the belief that stationary distribution is related to the number
of spanning trees, though clearly there is more at play here.
5.2 Methods
In using Recombination, we examined the 4G4 case. We explicitly calculated
% and used linear algebra to solve % = .
We started with a list of all possible plans and indexed them 1 through
117. We set up a table of 117 × 117 and set it entirely to zero.
For each pair (8 , 9)we found the common list which is the list of district
or districts the plans in comparison have in common. Then, we examine if
the two plans in question have two districts in common. The plans need to
have two districts in common for the Recombination method to work. If they
have three or four in common then they are the same plans. As previously
described, we calculate these probabilities when two districts are in common
by maintaining stochasticity.





possible pairs. The probability of doing so is 1(42)
. Skipping
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the second step of Recombination because it does not affect the probability
of transition leads us to the third step of picking a random spanning tree.
The probability of doing so is 1number of spanning trees . We found the number
of spanning trees by using Kirchoff’s Matrix-Tree Theorem as discussed in
Chapter 4. Thus, the fraction becomes 134C where 34C is the determinant of
the Laplacian of the union of two districts. We find the determinant by first
quantifying the vertices of districts not in common. Doing so is simpler in
calculation than finding vertices of districts in common Once that is found,
we take the union of all the vertices, make the Laplacian, and then find the
determinant of the Laplacian.
The fourth step of Recombination is picking a random edge of the
spanning tree. In a union of two 4 vertex districts graph there are eight
vertices, thus there are seven edges. The probability of picking a random
edge of the spanning tree is 17 . Finally, skipping the fifth step of removing
that edge to separate two districts because it does not involve a calculation
in the Recombination method, we reach the sixth step which is if the two
parts are of the same size, then they are our new districts. The probability
of this is the number of ways we could have gotten to the same plan via a
specific spanning tree and edge where the probability = 16 × 1spanning tree × 17 .
However, we could have arrived at the same plan with different spanning
trees and edges. To find the probabilitywemultiple each of the steps together
as so: 134C × 1(42)
× 17 ×ways to get same plan.
We are counting the number of spanning trees that, when cut, give the
new districts. We found the number of ways to get to the same plan through
a series of calculations. We first look at the number of edges between plan j
and its common list, as described above. This means that given the list of
edges in the common list, the number of edges between is the sum of edges
that have a node in the common list and a node not in the common list. In
the code we run through range four because there are four possible edges
between the two districts. If the value is not in the common list and the
district is a square, then we multiply the ways it could be the same plan by
four because a square district has four spanning tree possibilities.
We fill in each probability in the matrix with the proper probability.
For the probabilities of returning to the same districting plan, we maintain
stochasticity. We do so by summing up the row and setting the diagonal to 1
minus the sum.
When solving the % =  we solved (%T − ) = 0. Due to %T −  not
being full rank, we replaced the final column with 1’s because we need a
Methods
square matrix for the transposition to work. Entries in must sum to 1.We
solved the (% − ) by summing the rows to maintain stochasticity, meaning
they sum to 1. Using the transition matrix we found above, we set the 117th
column to 1. We transpose the transition matrix. Then we set - to be 1× 117
column vector of all zeros where the 117th entry is 1. We transpose -, and
use a code on Python, np.linalg.solve, that uses linear algebra to solve for .
This gives us our stationary distribution.
In the following tables we truncated the values to 10 decimal places
because when the values exceeded 10, we found numerical inconsistencies.
Rotated and reflected districting plans must have the same probability
distributions because of symmetry. Thus, differences in probabilities among
the same plans reflect estimations in the code. Additionally, the numbered
plans are according to our enumeration.
The code for these calculations and the list of plans can be found at
Github with this link under the names “Listof4x4Plans" and “RecomStat-
Dist4x4Grid.py":
https://github.com/sarah-cannon/RecombinationStationaryDistribution
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Table 5.1 Table of Complete Findings: First Grouping of Smallest Probabilities.
Plan Number of Plans that are Probability
Reflections/Rotations Reflections/Rotations
8 12, 22, 23, 45, 65, 93, 94, 102 0.0030503098
8 4, 20, 26, 64, 68, 87, 103, 108 0.0030505409
4 6, 16, 106, 109 0.0030547519
8 5, 18, 35, 36, 82, 83, 99, 107 0.0030559639
8 11, 15, 24, 46, 63, 91, 95, 111 0.0030564604
2 37, 80 0.0030566196
8 27, 38, 40, 61, 69, 79, 81, 85 0.0030572753
8 7, 17, 25, 39, 62, 84, 98, 110 0.0030606318
4 28, 60, 70, 86 0.0030626204
2 0, 116 0.0030667129
8 1, 3, 29, 59, 74, 75, 114, 115 0.0030728275
4 30, 57, 73, 78 0.0030765601
4 33, 58, 72, 76 0.0031571178
2 44, 88 0.0034370206
Methods
Table 5.2 Table of Complete Findings: Second Grouping of Probabilities
Plan Number of Plans that are Probability
Reflections/Rotations Reflections/Rotations
4 21, 34, 66, 100 0.0090170844
4 13, 41, 92, 97 0.0091650711
8 9, 14, 42, 43, 89, 90, 96, 105 0.0091653883
8 8, 19, 32, 47, 54, 67, 101, 112 0.0092067382
Table5.3 TableofCompleteFindings: ThirdGroupingofSmallestProbabilities
Plan Number of Plans that are Probability
Reflections/Rotations Reflections/Rotations
2 10, 104 0.0244428477
4 2, 48, 53, 113 0.0245788627
8 31, 49, 51, 52, 55, 56, 71, 77 0.0245844451
Table 5.4 Table of Complete Findings: Fourth Grouping of Largest Probabili-
ties





Conclusions and Future Work
Gerrymandering targets those not holding majority power and violates the
basis of America: democracy. Although America has a controversial history
with democracy and lack of equality that was not discussed in this paper, the
United States was founded on the idea of democracy and gerrymandered
plans directly contradict this basis. When the individual’s vote no longer
matters, democracy is no longer in play. By disabling the American vote that
was fought so hard for, the politicians behind gerrymandered districting
plans fundamentally reject the country they claim to stand for. Their
patriotism only suits themselves when they can hold power.
Thus, it is essential to detect and quantify gerrymandered plans in hopes
that the plans will cease to be in use. There are many unique methods to
detect and quantify plans, each with varied pros and cons. Recombination
is a method with pros outweighing cons, except for the lack of baseline.
This thesis found the baseline stationary distribution for a 4 × 4 grid graph,
adding to the foundation of understanding how to use Recombination as a
productive method.
There are many ways to begin considering detecting and quantifying
gerrymandering. Though we only examined one way, there is another way
closely linked to the way we chose that is a variant of Recombination also in
use. The alternative way is instead of picking two random districts, we pick
a random cut edge, where cut edge means the endpoints are in different
districts. Future work includes finding the stationary distribution for a 4 × 4
grid graph using this alternative method within Recombination.
Furthermore, we hope that the stationary distributions of more small
graphs will be found which will further this research beyond this thesis.
Understanding the stationary distribution in small examples may help
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understand in the state level.We hope that this information found will
contribute to the detection and quantification of gerrymandered plans in
the most productive way possible.
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